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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
  In his motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Lacy J. Goggans (“Goggans”) 
sought relief on multiple grounds, all of which were denied by the District Court.  This 
Court granted a certificate of appealability on two related questions:  “(1) whether trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the District Court’s failure to submit [the 
conspiracy count] on special interrogatories or, in the alternative, for failing to request 
submission on special interrogatories, and (2) whether counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise these same claims on appeal.”  (J.A. 28.)  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm the District Court’s order.  
I. Background Facts 
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential 
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facts. 
 Lacy Goggans, along with co-defendants Ronald Blackwell, Trenell Coleman, and 
Ryan Washington, were indicted for various offenses relating to nine violent bank 
robberies and the attempted robbery of a tenth bank.  Goggans was convicted of 
conspiracy to commit bank robbery; attempted bank robbery; two counts of using and 
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and one count of being a 
felon-in-possession.  On direct appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed his conviction and 
the two mandatory 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentencing enhancements, but remanded for 
resentencing pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  United States v. 
Goggans, 257 F. App’x 515, 517-18 (3d Cir. 2007).  After resentencing, we affirmed his 
judgment of conviction.  United States v. Goggans, 386 F. App’x 171, 174 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 Goggans filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising various issues.  The 
District Court denied the motion and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.  A 
motions panel of this Court granted a certificate of appealability on the two related claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.1  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
                                                            
1 In his opening brief, Goggans raises a question as to the sufficiency of the 
evidence and claims that “the District Court committed a fundamental error of law by 
improperly sentencing Goggans twice under § 924(c).”  (Br. for Pet’r-Appellant 31.)  
Since these issues are beyond the scope of the certificate of appealability, we may not 
consider them.  Villot v. Varner, 373 F.3d 327, 337 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.1 (2011).   
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  “In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we 
exercise plenary review of the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings.  We review the District Court’s denial 
of an evidentiary hearing in a habeas case for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Lilly, 
536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
III. Analysis 
 Goggans argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
request that the District Court submit to the jury special interrogatories on the conspiracy 
count.  His second claim alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
this claim on direct appeal.  According to Goggans, special interrogatories were needed 
to determine whether he had conspired to commit the completed robberies, the attempted 
robbery, or both.  
 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established 
a two-part test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  The first part of the 
Strickland test “requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. 
at 687.  The second part specifies that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  “‘The purpose of the 
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Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance 
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Marshall v. Hendricks, 
307 F.3d 36, 107 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92).  “Because 
under Strickland either prong can be dispositive, if we can conclude that there is no 
prejudice — i.e., that even if counsel had not failed in the ways alleged, there is no 
reasonable probability that the outcome would be different — our analysis would be at an 
end.” Id. 
 On direct appeal Goggans argued that the criminal course of conduct included in 
the conspiracy count and the attempted robbery count “were not only continuous but 
involve[d] the same attempted bank robbery.”  (J.A. 1073).  According to Goggans, 
“[a]ppellant’s second conviction under § 924(c)(1) . . . involve[d] the same predicate 
offense included under the first conviction under § 924(c)(1) . . . and, thus, should be 
vacated.”  (Id. at 1074).   
 This Court has already reviewed the issue presented here and affirmed the two 
§ 924 convictions and sentences.  As a result, we can find no prejudice resulting from 
either trial counsel’s or appellate counsel’s performance. 
IV. Conclusion 
 We conclude that Goggans failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.  
We therefore will affirm the District Court’s order.  
